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huffer between soldiers and overzealous law enforcement agents. Implicit in her third alternative argument is the assumption
that commanders will base their"investigatory detention" authorizations on "reasonable suspicion/'
·
I

)'he Co!-lrt of ~ili!ary Appeals has yet to -clearly define. the
approaches . to
.thls difficult. issue.
·
.. :

Dun~way rule in a military context. Both articles present potential
·.

'

Investigative Detentions for Purposes

of Fingerprhiting

· Lieutenant Colonel David A. Schlueter (USAR) •
Criminal Law Division, The Judge Advocate General's School

i-

Introducti~n

.

Following a series of barracks larcenies, Naval Investiga~
tive Service (NIS) investigators received permission from a
Marine battalion commander to fingerprint approximately
100 servicemembers who had been present in the_ unit at the
'time ()f the offenses. ·Among those ordered to report to the
NIS office for fingerprinting was the accUsed, who was later
linked to ·the crime through his fingerprints. Before the· accused· reported to -the NIS office there was no probable
cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that he was in any
·way involved -in the crimes. Were the fingerprints
admissible?
The court in United States v. Faga, 1 held that they were.
Relying on. dicta in several Supreme Court decisions and
the authority of a commander to act as a judicial ,officer, the
court· held that the ·presence of the commander negated the
requir~ment for probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
This case points' out the difficult questions that faee investi~
gators,~ lawyers, and judges, when the issue is raised as to
what procedures are required in investigative detentions for
the purpose of obtaining fingerprints.
Unfortunately, aside from Supreme COurt dicta and several state court decisions, there is little guidance in the area.
It is not yet clear whether the guidance that does exist is
· even constitutional. This article addresses some of the major issues that surround investigative detentions and offers
some suggested approaches to the problem.
DlUUiway, Davis, and Dicta

In the typical investigative detention scenario, an individis taken to the police station by law enforcement officers .

ua~

for the purpose of interrogation, fingerprinting, production
of other boQy e~idence, or participation in an eyewitness
identification.'The common element'in all of.these activities
is the fact. that these .sort of appearances ra~se fourth
amendment seizure issues. Absent an individual's voluntary
appearance at the police station, the government must normally demonstrate that. the police had .probable cause to
take the suspect to their offices. For example, in Dunaway v.
New York. 2 the Supreme Court held that removing a sus~
pect to the police station for purposes of custodial
interrogation constitutes a seizure of the person that must
be supported by probable cause. Although .the military
courts have recognized the applicability of Du(Jaway to_ military interrogations, they have not always been consistent in
application of the rule. 3
There seems to be a perceptible trend toward permitting
investigative detentions for some purpose even when no
probable cause is present. The trend js ·fueled in large part
by dicta in Davis v. Mississippi 4 and Hayes v. Florida. 5 In
Davis, the defendant was one of 24 black youths brought to
a police station for fingerprinting in connection with a rape
case. The Supreme Court held that .the fingerprints so obtained were the r~ult of an illegal detention. Whether these
intrusions are labelled as arrests or investigative detentions,
said the Court, the fourth amendment "was meant to pre~
vent wholesale intrusions upon personal security of our
citizenry. . . ."., ln dicta; ·however, the Court indicated
that because of the unique nature of fingerprinting, it was
arguable that detentions for such purposes might comply
with the fourth amendment even though there was no prob~
able cause in the traditional sense. 7 The Court noted that
"fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable .and effective

"'TTle author is an Associate Dean and Professor of Law at St. Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas. This article was adapted from remarks presented by
the author at the 13th Annual Homer Ferg11son Conference
I·.
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. 24JvU. 86S (N.M.C.M.R. 1987).
2442U.S. 200 (1979). · ,
l

, .

See United States v. Schneider, 14 M.J. 189 (C. M.A. 1982) (Dunaway is applicable to the military although the court recognized "obvious differences"

between military and civilian practices; servicemember may legitimately be required to present infonnation without probable cause in a variety of places.
Court lists factors to be considered in an ad hoc approach); United States _v. Scott, 22 M.J. 297 (C.M.A. 1986). Cf. United States v. Thomas, 21 M.J.. 928
(A.C.M.R. 1986) (Dunaway not applicable where servicemember merely reports, even if involuntanly, to a location speCified by a superior's order. The test is
whether by means of force or. show of authority, the person is subjected to significantly greater restraif11 upon their freedom of movement than other ser·
vicemembers);United States v._ Price, l~ M.J, 628 (N.M.C.M.R. 1982) (Dunaway not applicable where aecused was one of 10 individuals ordered to report
to NJS office).
·
·
·
··
4

394

5470

u.s.c. 721 (1969),
u.s: 811 (1985),

6

394 U.S. at 72f>.:-27.

7

Id. at 727.

10

,-
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crime~solving tool than eyewitness identifications or co~'res
sions and is not subjectto such abuses as the improperJineup and the 'third degree.' t' s
The Court reiterated its dicta in Davis in the case of
Hayes v. Florida, q wherethe defendant. had be.en t~ken
from his home to the police station for, purposes of fingerprinting. The Court ruled that the involuntary removal of a
person from .his home to the police station for purposes of
fingerprinting, without pri.or judicial approval, required
probable cause. 1° Citing the familiar "stop and frisk" cases,
the Court observed that there is support in those cases for
. the proposition that the fourth amendment would permit
police to .temporarily detain a person for purposes of finger- ·
printing: (1) if there is reasonable suspicion that the person
committed an offense; (2) If there is reasonable belief that
fingerprinting the individual will establish or negate his
connection with the crime; and (3) if the procedure is conducted without delay. 11 The Court again noted that "the
Fourth Amendment might permit thejudiciary to auth<;>rize
the seizure of a person on less than probable cause and his
removal to the police station for the purpose of fingerprinting." 12 The Court, howeve~. did not clarify what the level
of justification should be, or what procedures would be considered sufficiently protective for station-house
fingerprinting.
Given the repeated dicta that some basis less than pro):>able .cause might support station-house fingerprinting, it is
not surprising that some states have promulgated specific
procedures for obtaining judicial authorization for such investigative detentions.
·

State Response to the Davis-Hayes Dicta
In responding to the Davis-Hayes dicta, states have
adopted a variety of.procedures 'and standards. Colorado
and Nebraska are illustrative.
·
Colorado. has adopted a comprehensive state· criminal
procedural rule .which provides ,guidelines for obtaining
"nontestimonial identification" such: as fingerprints, bandwriting, blood, urine, .and,hair sarnples.D The procedures
are specifically not applicable to interrogation procedures. 14
In summary, the Colorado procedures require a judicial order supported by a written affidavit setting out articulable,
objective facts which provide probable cause to believe that

a crime has been committed and reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect committed the offense. In addition,
the judicial order, which is only valid for 10 days, must
specify the conditions of the temporary detention and· inust
.>be returned to the judge with the results' of the identifiCation procedures. " These procedures were held to be
constitutional in People v. Madson, 16 in which the court
specifically noted that they were instituted in response to
the suggestive dicta in Davis. 17
.

In contrast' to th~ COlorado procedures are the st~tutory
procedures in Nebraska which require that there be a showing of probable cause before a suspect may be taken to the
police station for'fingerprinting. 18 In State v. Evans, 1q the
Nebraska Supreme Court disagreed with those states that
permitted detentions on less than probable cause. In its
view, the relevant United States Supreme Court cases require probable cause .to remove a person to the police
station. 20
It is important to note that in each of these two c~es; . the
investigation had focused. on a particular individual. It
would appear that the major disagreement was over the
question of whether. there should ~ a requisite showing of
probable cause 'to believe that the· particular suspect committed the offense. It is also important to note that these
cases and procedures predated the Supreme Court's dicta in
Florida v. Hayes, which specifically restated .the proposition
in Davis that some justification less than· probable cause
might suffice.

The Military Response:
United States v. Fagan
.: ;
'

'

The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review .addressed the applicability of the Davis-.(Iayes dicta-in United
States v. Fagan. 21 In that case, NIS investigators had I'ta·
son to believe that the perpetrator of a series of bar:racks
servicemembers.
larcenies was one of approximately
They received the battalion cpmmander's permission to fi~
gerprint the servicemembers at the NIS office 22. and a siaff
officer was appointed to coordinate the process of taking
them to the office in groups of 15 to 20. 23 The accused
complied with the procedures mily after he was told .that
his paychecJc, would be withheld until he appeared. 24 When
the accused reported for fingerprinting, investigators noted
that he had tried to scrape his fingertips but that some features of his prints matched patterns in latent prints found at

too

8/d.
q 470

U.S. 81 I (1985).

10

!d. at 817-18.
11 Jd. at 816.
12 /d. at 817.
13 Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.1 (1973). The rule is apparently modeled ~fter Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.i (1971) reported at 53 F.R.D. 462 (1971).
14 Colo. R. Crim. P. 4l.l(h)(2).
IS Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.1(e), (!).
16 638 P.2d 18 (Colo. 1981) (en bane).
17
ld. at 31.
• 1.M Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3301, et. seq.
19 215 Neb. 433, 338 N.W.2d 788 (1983). ·
20 215 Neb. at 438, 338 N.W.2d'at 793. The court.nonetheless round probable·cause.
21
24 M.J. 865 (N.M.C.M.R. 1985).
22 Id. at 866.
l.lld.
24/d.
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·the :scene.'21 He was advised of his rights and interrogated.
Later in the same day, his hands were photographed and
his· fingerprints were taken. 2"
'

.

.

Because the first set of fingerprints was unreadable, NIS
agents approached, the accused several months later at the
installation hospital. 27 When he refused their request to
· supply additional fingerprints, a Hospitalman First Class
ordered him to comply. When the accused refused that order, be was told by the NIS agents that they would
eventualJy qbtain his prints even if it meant arresting him.
Rather than risk the embarrassment of being apprehended,
. pe went to the NIS offices several days tater and was fingerprinted, without incident. His ·prints matched those taken
,from the crime scene. 28
.
.

. In concJuding that the fingerprints were admissible as the
fruits of two separate and reasonable seizures of the accused, the court noted that the initial seizure of the accused
occurred when he was ordered,by his battalion commander
. ,to proceed to the .NIS office. 29 The court concluded that although that seizure.was notsupported by. probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that the accused was involved in the
. crimes, it was nonetheless reasonable considering the bal. ance of the government's inter,est and the minimum
intrusiveness of the fingerprinting procedures. 30 The court
. drew heavily upon the Davis-Hayes dicta in concluding that
the commander in this case was acting in his magisterial capacity when he ordered the mass fingerprinting. The court
stated:
Although the commander in his quasi-judicial capacity
. did not issue. a warrant for the production of finger/ print exemplars, as envisioned in Hayes and Davis, we
conclude that within the military context, his presence
safeguarded the appelliUlt from ·oppressive governmental' action and ftis order thereby qualifies as the
functional equivalent of the ·"circumscribed procedure" ·prescribed in Hayes and Davis which ·warrant
the seizure of persons· for ·fingerprinting· on less than
probable cause. As there is no civilian counterpart for
· the iniHtary commander, our interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment recognizes that it must be construed 'with' the "C?ntext of military society." As such,

we believe the· presence of the commander. initially ne•
gated the requirement for probable cause or Teasonable
suspicion, where the appellant was treated properly at
NIS and without fear 9r stigma. . . . 31 .
As for the second fingerprinting session, the court relied on
additional dicta in Hayes, which suggested that bdef field
detentions could be used for fingerprinting if based upon
reasonable suspicion. 32 Here, said the court, the NIS agents
bad more than a reasonable suspicion that the accused was
linked with the crime when they approached him at the
. hospital. Because reasonable force could have been used to
take his. fingerprints, the court considerea it proper to
. "threaten" him with forcible loss of his freedom if he did
not cooperate and permit his prints to be taken. ll
.

.

A Response to Fagan: Measuring the "Circumscribed
Procedures"
While .analyzing· investigative. detention cases grounded
on the· Davis-Hayes dicta, it is important to remember that
the Supreme Court apparently envisions a narrow and
stingy exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements. It. is also important to distinguish between
investigative detentions which take place in the "field" and
those which involve transporting the suspect to the offices
of law enforcement personnel. With regard to "field" fingerprinting, the Court in Hayes envisioned a narrowly defined
three-pronged requirement which incl~des: a reasonable
suspicion that the suspect oommitted a crime; a reasonable
basis for believing that the fingerprinting will establish or
negate guilt; and a fingerprinting procedure that is "carri.ed
out with dispatch." 34
•
· ·
With regard· to poJic~ .station detentions· for purposes of
fingerprinting, the Court 'in Davis recognized that detentions for fingerprints might .. . . . under narrowly defined
circumstances, be found to comply with the Fourth Amend·
ment even though there is no probable cause in the
traditional sense." ls In Hayes, the Court stated that "under
circumscribed procedures; the fourth amendment might permit the judiciary to authorize the seizure of a person on less
than probable cause and his removal to the police station

25
!d. Trial testimony from a forensic pathologist indicated that the scrapes were not accidental and had apparently been ~ade a short time before they were
photographed by the NIS agents. 24 M.J. at 871.
·
26 Id.

at 869.

27

It is not clear from the court's opinion whether the accused was at the hospital due to an illness or whether he was otherwise assigned to the hospital
'
pursuant to his duties.
2&24 M.J. at 870.
29

ld.

ld. at 866-67. The court concluded that the accused's freedom of movement was restrained against his will "solely for the purpose of law enforcement."
.
. . .
.
.
.
'

30 24

M.J. at 867.

31

Id. at 868-69 (citations omitted).

32

470 U.S. at 816.

24 M.J. at 871. It does not seem likely that this is the sort of conclusion that the Supreme Court had in mind in the Hayes dicta. Although the poli~e may
surely use reasonable force to effect an otherwise lawful seizure and investigation, it seems to stretch that case to the point where law enforcement officers
may compel the suspect to appear at their office if he dOes not cooperate in the absence of probable cause. Here, the simple answer seems to be that when the
NlS agents approached the suspect at the hospital they had probable cause to believe that be had committed the crime ancl therefore they could have
brought him to their office without regard to whether they first asked his superior to order him to undergo additional fingerprinting.
33

34
470 u.s. at 817. Although the three-pronged requirement seems specific enough, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent in Hayes. there will certainly be problems of application. For example, he noted that such field detentions would apparently be undertaken.in public view-which would be a ''singular
intrusion" that could not be justified as necessary for the officer's safety. He also noted the difficulty of deciding how long to hold the suspect. ld. at 819.
JS 394 V.S. at 727.

12
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for· the purpose of fingerprinting. nJi> Although the Court
did not suggest what "circumscribed procedures" would
pass constitutional muster, it seems clear that the Court envisioned "judicial" authorization and supervision. when the
basis for seizure was premised on something less ;than probable cause. ·.
.. Given the Court's narrow language, both Jor field and office detentions, the result in Fagan seems strained. The
Court of Military Review stretched the Davis-Hay~s dicta
with regard to the basis for ordering a servicemember to report to investigative offices for the purposes of
fingerprinting, and exaggerated the magisterial role of the
commander in ordering such intrusions.
With regard to the permissible basis for fingerprinting detentions, the Supreme Court's dicta does not in any way
suggest that, for purposes of fingerprinting, not even reasonable suspicion is required. Instead, .as noted supra, the
Court in Hayes v. Florida specifically envisioned that the
police must have reasonable suspicion that.the suspect; committed a crime before taking fingerprints in the field. 37 It
would be anomalous to require reasonable suspicion to support a "stop and frisk" detention for fingerprinting and yet
conclude that neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion would be necessary to support the removal of a suspect
to the police station.
Witl~ regard to who may authorize office detentions for
purposes of fingerprinting, the Supreme Court's dicta leaves
no ~oubt that the Court would ·expect that the process
wouJd be approved and supervised by the judiciary. The
question for military CoUrtS then is whether the commander
might properly fill that role. 38 It seems clear that· for purposes of authorizing seizures for purposes of fingerprinting,
a commander may act in a quasi-judicial capacity. It seems
Jess certain that when the com111ander does so, such approval negates the requirement of probable cause or
reasonable suspicion. Indeed, the military law on this issue
is well-settled and neither the dicta in Hayes and Davis nor
military necessity calls for a new rule. 39 It also seems less

. certain that the commander's approval negates the requirement to follow circumscribed procedures for ensuring that
the suspect's rights are not unduly abrogated.
~!though in Fagan the NIS obtained permission from the
battalion commander to fingerprint the 100 servicemembers, it is not clear from the Court's opinion what,
if any, articulable facts they presented to the commander.
Nor is it clear to what extent the liaison officer appointed
by the commander supervised the procedures. 40 What is
clear, as the court recognized, is that there was neither
probable cause nor reasonable suspicion supporting the
commander's order that the accused report to the NIS office for fingerprinting. 41

Looking for Help in the Rules of Evidence
The Military Rules of Evidence provide no specific guidance on investigative detentions, either in the field or at the
police station, for purposes of fingerprinting. Rule 314(f) 42
addresses searches incident to lawful stops but sets out no
guidelines as to whether the "stop" may include other identification procedures such as fingerprinting.
Rule 312 governs body views and intrusions and might
provide the basis of fingerprinting. For example, Rule
312(b) addresses "visual examination" of the body but
hinges such examinations on other authorized intrusions
such as a valid inspection, 43 a search incident to apprehension, 44 an emergency search, 45 or a probable cause
search. 46 It would require a strained reading of Rule 312,
however, to permit investigators to take an individual to
their office for the specific purpose of fingerprinting, without some independent predicate.
·
Rule 31 6(f) may pro~ide a vehicle for j~dicial adoption of
the ''circumscribed procedures" envisioned in the DavisHayes dicta for fingerprinting in either the field or at the
·police ·station. That rule provides:
Other seizures. A seizure of a type not otherwise in"
· Cluded in this rule may be made when permissible

36 470

U.S. at 817. In Da~is the Court stated:
.
.
We have no occasion in this case, howev~r. to determine whether the requirements of the Fourth Amendment could be met by narrowly circumscribed
procedures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal investigation, 'the fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable cause to arrest. 394
U.S. at 728 (emphasis added).

37 470

U.S. at 817.

38 See

Schlueter, Military Criminal Jus; ice: fractice and Procedure,§ 5-2(A) at 152 (2d ed. 1987); Cooke, United States v. Ezell: Is the
trate? Maybe, The Army Lawyer, Aug. 1979, at 9.

Com~ander a,Magis-

19
• Cf. Mil. R. Evid. 313(b). The commander can obviously make some fourth amendment-type intrusions for certain noninvestigative reasons without triggering the requirements of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Although it is conceivable that an en masse fingerprinting procedure might be justified on
grounds of security, fitness, or good order and discipline, if that procedure was conducted for purposes of obtaining evidence, it could not be treated as a
·
valid inspection under Rule 313.
40
The court indicated that the NJS agents would call the liaison officer and ask that he provide them with "15 or 20 members of the battalion at a given
time and a given place" for fingerprinting. The liaison officer apparently maintained the master list of who had been fingerprinted. 24 M.J. at 866.

41 24 M.J. at 868. The court noted, however, that the NIS agents had reasonable grounds to believe that one of the approximately 100 Marines had commit·
ted. the offense and that the fingerprinting process would identify the perpetrator. ld.
42 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, Military Rule of Evidence 314 [hereinafter Mil. R. Evid.]. Rule 314 governs searches not requiring probable cause; Rule 314(1) is a codification of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968). In 1984, Rule 314(1)(3) was added to incorporate the "automobile frisk"
recognized in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). See generally; S. Saltzburg, L. Schinasi, and D. Schlueter, Military Rules of E~idence Manual at
255-56 (2d ed. 1986). As noted supra the Supreme Court has stated in dicta that Terry stops might properly include fingerprinting. Nor is there any real
help in RCM 302, which governs military apprehensions. The discussion to that rule merely notes the distinction between apprehensions and investigative
detention.

41

Mil. R. Evid. 313(b).

44 Mil.

R. Evid. 314(g).

45

Mil. R. Evid. 314(i) ..

46

Mil. R. Evid. 315.
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-under the.Consti-tution of the United States as applied
to members. of the· Armed Forces.
This rule, which p~allels .the catch-all .provision iri' Mili- ta,t:y. Rule of Evidence 314(k) for nonprobable cause
, searches, permits some leeway; in the application of constitutionally·. permissible seizures which ,are not otherwise
specifically mentioned in the Rules. 47 .Seizures· for the specific purpose of fingerprinting would seem to be -safe
. candidates for this catch-aU provision.
Assuming that there is room within the Rules of Evidence for judicial adoption ofsome narrowly defined
procedures, there is the question of actuaJly settling upon
these guidelines that may be readily and constitutionally
applied in a. principled fashion. Given the absence of specific guidance ·in the Rules themselves, it would seem
_preferable to consider amendments to either Rule -316, 314,
. or 312 that would clearly set out defined .procedures tailored to milita,ry practices. 48
·
.

.

-,

'

Circumscribed PrOcedures: A Model

Using the Davis-Hayes dicta, Proposed Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41.1 (1971), 49 and a variety of state
· procedur~s adopted in reliance on that dicta,, 50 it should
not be difficult. to adopt ,some procedures, either judicially
•·· or through formal. amendments to. the Rules of Evidence,
Jor,extending the "Terry stop" to fingerprinting at the scene
of the stop (in Rule 314) and for removing an individual to
the investigators' office for the. specific pul"}>Qse of obtaining
. fingerprints (in Rule 316). .In any event, several key topics
must be considered:

Characterizati~n of the Intrusion

48

s~pra

If the suspect, or accu:;ed is not already within· t~e lawful
custody. of the. police, it is necessary that some. authorization or justification ~ articulated .to support the "seizure"
of the person for the purpose of obtaining fingerprints. 55
That justification may rest, as suggested in the Davis-Hayes
·dicta; on extending the ..Terry stop'' to indude brief detentions for fingerprinting, or' it_ may be justified by judicia1ly
'supervised ·procedures ·that entail removing ·the individual
to the' police station. 'In :either instance, the. individual has
been "seized" and that necessarily invokes the protections
of· the fourth ·amendment. 56 Of course, if the individual
consents to the seizure, in much the same way an individual
may consent to a search, then it should not be neeessaty to
· 'show the underlying basis or approval for the seizure. 57

Power to Authorize Investigative Detentions
•

·;

.

.

!

.

'

'

•. '

..

:for fi1,1gerprinting in the fieJd, the Supreme Court's dicta
. in ·Hayes already sets our clear guidelines which'authorize
those making otherwise lawful "Terry siops"to firgerprint
· those who have been detained. ~ 8 The same rule could be
•easily .adapted to the military.
•

In ~ddressing th~ issue of investigative detentions for the
purposes offingerprinting it is important to define what
.goyernmental action triggers the fourth amendf!lent. It is
47
SeeS. Saltzburg, { Schinasi, and' D. Schlueter,
Rule, the ''legislative" intent seems clear.
·

well settled that ;an individual normally. has no reasonit~le
.expectation of privacy in his or her fingerprints. 51 'fhus;the
process of actuallytaking fingerprints does not normally invoke the protections of the fourth amendment. 52 If t~e
suspect .or accused is already subject. to lawful authority
pursuant to an arrest or apprehension, the additional. st~ps
. of obtaining fingerprints or other identification evidence,
· such as ·voice exemplars or other superficial body evidence, n :are normally permitted without additional
· authorizaiion or approval. 54

c

:

..

•,'

.For detentions involving removal of the suspect to the of: flees of law enforcement officers, the solution again seems
easily applied. Although the Davis-Hayes dicta envisions judicial approval, for the military that would include

note 42 at 302. Note that although
,_. · '
·

the;~ is no Prafters' Analysis for
·

this particular

·

subp~rt of the
·· ·

/d. at 85 (there should be a preference for the "legislative" process which lends to interservice uniformity).

~ 9 The text of the proposed Rule, entitled Nontestimonialldentifications, is printed at 52 F.R.D. 409 (1971). ·
· 50 See,

~.g. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 13-3905; Col. R. Crim. P. 4Ll; Idaho Code§ 19~25; and N.C. Gen. Stats. § 15A-271, et seq.

Cup~~. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291

(1973); UnitedStates·~. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I (1973); United States v. Hardison, 17 M.J. 191 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983).
implicating "body" evidence, there is always the possibility that the procedures used "shocked the conscience" or were otherwise unreasonable and thus infringed upon the suspect's due process rights. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also S. Saltzburg, L. Schinasi, and D.
Schlueter, supra note 42 at 224. Because of the limired physical intrusion fingerprinting, -it should not be necessary to use medically trained personnel as is
required in more intrusive body inspections or intrusions. See, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 312(d), (e).
'
··
5l United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); United States v. Repp, 23 M.J.-S89 (A:F.C.M.R. 1986) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in arms); United
''States v. Hardison, 17 M.J. 701 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983) (no expectation of privacy In appearance which would bar photographing suspect). See also In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 686 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1982) (grand jury request for hair samples did not amount to search·or seizure).
54 Different rules may apply for more intrusive procedures which are used to obtain body fluids or other evidence within the body. MiL R Evid. 312(d), (e).
'·· Cf MiL R. Evid. 313(b) (inspection may iriclude order to provide body fluids).
55
See, e.g:, United States v: Hardison, I '1 M.f '101 (N.M.C.M.R: 1983) (fingerprints taken of suspect already within lawful custody of NIS agents);'See also
United States•v, Sechrist, 640 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Sanders, 477 F.2d 112 {5th Cir. 1973).
, . r.
56 Although the "basis" for such limited seizures may not require probable cause, the Dunaway-Schneider test for· determining when a servicemember has
been seized within the meaning of the fo11rth .amendment should remain .usefuL There is a problem with application of.that principle to ,mass sei~ures, such
as in Fagan where 100 individuals were ordered to report. Technically, all of them were targets .l>f the investigation allhpugh the reCord does not il;ldicate
wbether·any of them, besides the accused, protested. The better _starting point is to conclude that all of them were seized within the meaning of the fourth
. amendment; as applied in the military context, and then determine whether a sufficient fourth amendment basis, also applied in the military context, sup,
.
· .
. .·
.
.
.
.·
.
.
.
, ,
ported these seizures. ·
The Supreme Court has distinguished subpoenas and investigative detentions, see, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. I (1973), in large part'becailse
of the lack of stigma in the former procedure and because they are within the control and supervision of the court. Investigative detentions at the office of the
law enforcement agent should not fall within that category unless they have been judicially approved and supervised.
·
H See, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 3 14{e). Indeed, it would seem appropriate to require investigators requesting authorization to first show that the individual has not
consented, or is expected not to consent.
~M470 U.S. at 816-17.
5•1 See. e.g.,
52 In any procedure

of
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commanders who already are authorized to approve probable cause searches ' 9 and to order inspections. (>()

Basis for Authorization
For field detentions, the Supreme Court's dicta in Davis
and Hayes seems to articulate clearly what the Court envisions as the minimal constitutional basis for taking
fingerprints. As noted, supra, the investigators must be prepared to show that they had a reasonable basis for believing
that the fingerprinting procedures would either connect the
suspect with the crime or clear him. 61 Thus, it would seem
that the Court envisioned something beyond a routine and
carte blanche authorization to fingerprint those stopped in
the field.
·
Perhaps the most critical issue in adopting rules and procedures for fingerprinting at the offices of the investigators
is the question of whether probable cause must be shown,
as is now required under Dunaway for custodial interrogations, or whether to follow the Davis-Hayes dicta and adopt
some lesser standard. If a lesser standard is appropriate,
what should it be? Clearly, the safest and most protective
constitutional route is to require probable cause for the underlying seizure of the suspect or accused. But that may
unduly bind investigators who have some articulable justification amounting to less than probable cause which would
reasonably expedite criminal investigation.
Good arguments for adopting a standard less than probable cause are recognized and catalogued in the Davis and
Hayes cases and need only be summarized here: the fingerprinting procedures are generally more reliable; they do not
entail subjecting the suspect to the abuses such as the
.. third degree" or an improper line-up; they need not be
conducted unexpectedly; and they are usually less intrusive
than other police detentions and searches. 62 These differences are not compelling enough, however, to justify
seizures without any basis whatsoever.
The better route is to adopt a reasonable suspicion standard. That would be consistent with the minimum for field
detentions. At the same time, this standard recognizes that,
although there are always the inherent embarrassments,
dangers, and fears most often associated with police station
'

9

· appearances. intervening judicial authorization can interpose reasonable limits upon the detention in terms of its
length and scope.
There is a related problem of the scope of the suspicion.
Must it focus on one individual or may it focus on a larger
and more generalized population? In the state cases cited
supra, investigators had focused on a particular suspect. In
contrast, the NIS investigators in Fagan focused on 100 servicemembers-hardly individualized suspicion. Despite the
court's characterization to the contrary, that sort of massive fingerprinting appears to be a ''dragnet." Absent truly
extraordinary reasons, it is probably safe to say that similar
procedures would normally not be tolerated in· the civilian
community. 63
There is some support in New Jersey v. TLO, 64 a school
search case, for the proposition that in certain instances a
generalized suspicion may suffice. 65 In the context of the
fingerprinting, those seeking judicial approval for the fingerprinting should be prepared to show that there is reasonable
suspicion to believe that an .individual or identified group of
individuals are implicated and that all other necessary and
reasonable means of investigation have failed to identify'the
perpetrator. The greater the number of possible suspects,
the greater should be the burden of showing necessity for
the procedures, and the exhaustion. of other reliable police
investigative techniques. The type and severity of the offense should also be factored into the formula. 66
Investigative fingerprint detentions should never become
.routine to the extent that every time latent fingerprints are
discovered at the scene of a crime that any and all individuals in any way remotely linked with the offense can be
taken in for fingerprinting .
Although written affidavits are.not required for p~obable
cause searches, 67 good arguments can be rriade for requiring law enforcement officers to place their justifications for
fingerprinting requests in writing, especially if the proposed
procedures involve mass detentions. Similarly it. would
seem preferable to require the individual requesting the fingerprinting detention to be placed under oath. 68 Unlike
probable cause searches which may involve an element of
urgency for prompt approval and execution, fingerprinting

Mil. R. Evid. 315(d).

(>()Mil. R. Evid. 313(b).

u.s.

61

470

62

Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. at 727 (1969).

817.

6
J C/ In re Fingerprinting of M.D., 125 N.J. Super. 115, 309 A.2d 3 (1973) (22 students fingerprinted pursuant to court order when school ring was found
near homicide victim and victim's car contained fingerprints other than victim's; order included protective provision for destruction of prints at conclusion of
investigation). The tolerance level no doubt rises with the severity of the crime. Whether several barracks larcenies involving stereo equipment justifies fingerprinting 100 servicemembers is open to debate. Assuming that such offenses, in the context of the time and place, are clearly and objectively viewed as
serious offenses, someone other than the police should make that determination. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979) (danger in permitting
police to strike the balance between social and individual interests).

u.s. 343 (1985).

64

469

M

ld. at 342, n.8. The Court stated in part:
We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by school authorities. In
other contexts, however, we have held that althoUgh "some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite .to a constitutional search or ,
seizure . . . the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion . : . Exceptions to the requirement of individualized suspi·
cion are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" are available to
"assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the field.' " (Citations omitted.)

66
See United States v. Jennings, 468 F.2d Ill (9th Cir. 1972) (court declined to apply Davis dictum when suspect was detained in order to match his prints
with those found on marijuana wrappers). See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3905 (police must show "reasonable belier• that felony has been committed).

~ 7 Mil. R. Evid. 31 5(0, Drafters' Analysis.

bHUnited States v. Stuckey, 10 M.J. 347 (C.M.A. 1981).
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generally does not and it would .not seem unreasonable to
·impose these 8dditiona1 safeguards.
~. ·

.maintain th~ unique. features of fingerprinting which distinguish that procedure from interrogation and line-up
procedures. 74

SC!'pe of Authorization

Exigencies

the· ''judicial"· authorization· to conduct a police station
investigative detention should specify the exact seope and
·purpose;ofthe detention."" For 'example, the authorization
eould sbtte that only fingerprints will be taken and that no
interfogation is authorized unless there is a showing of
probable cause. 70 If mv~tigators desire to gather additional
identification evidence such as voice prints or hair samples,
the authoniation should cover those points. If the investi.gator8 desire
obtain body evidence such as blood, urine,
or saliva samples, they should be otherwise prepared to
eomply with Military Rule of Evidence 312. Finally, considering the possibiHty of police overreaching, and ·for
pragmatic 'reasons associated· with· proof at trial, it would
seem prefer~ble to reduce the authorization to writing.

to

'

'

.

'

Exectitlon
Like the provisions for executing search authorizations, 71
.any authorization to fingerprint individuals or to obtain
other body evidence should include a· provision for notify.
ingthe individual ofthe purpose of thedetention. 72 As has
been adopted in'at least one state, the execution of the au·
thcirization may be.limited to a particular time, such as
.regular duty hours, and may be effective for a definite period
time.•73 Th~ purJ>ose·of all of this is to reftect and

of

69 See,

e.g.

Pr~~ Fed. R. crim. P. 41.1; Colo.

R. Crim. P.

Finally, provision should be made .for the fact that in
some limited _situa~ions, exigent circumstances might P,revent obtaining prior authorization .. Nonetheless, just as
exigent circumstances will normaJiy not warrant. abrogation
of the requirement for probable cause, 7$ exigencies should
not abrogate the requirement for reasonable suspicion. Because fingerprints are .not evanescent, 76 there should be
very few cases where investigators .cannot obtain. prior. and
careful review of their request to take the fingerprints. 77
•Conclusioll

Tlte Fagan case is an unmistakable i~dication t~f 'a gap
exists in both the Military Rules of Evidence and military
case. law: Given the unique issues raised by that case and
.the problems it demonstrates, some careful .consideration
should be givento developing clear, and definit.e principles
which can be readily applied by a worldwide legal system.
The most logical choice is a series of amendments. to ,the
Rules of. Evidence that. would address not only. fingerprint·
ing, but· related evidence-gathering techniques .which in
themselves generally .will not require a further invasion of
privacy but which, at the outset, require seizure of the indi·
viduaL Such changes would help ensure that the
administration of criminal justice in the military is not haphazard or unprincipled.
·

4Ll~

~·

°For example, in Fagan the NIS investlgat~rs, according to the court, had probable cause when th~y .examined the suspect's fif!g~rtips and determi~ed that

7

-he bad attempted to remove his prints. 24 M.J. at 869-70. ..
71 Mil. R. Evid. 315(h).
12 Mil. R.: Evid~ jJS(h)(l )..

.

.·

'

·.

.

·

.

retur~able within 45 days).
~- MisSissippi, 394 u.s. at 727.
·
·
.
··
.
·
. 75 See! Mil .• R: ·Evid. 'j I S(g) (the exigent ciri:umstances only relieve the requirement o.f the search warrant or authori~tion).
1l See, e;g,, cOlo. R. Crim. P. 41.1(1)(10 days); Proposed Fed. R. Crim. P. 41.1 Oudicial order
74 Davis

.?6 Davis v.

Mississippi, 394 U.S. at 727 (there is no danger of destruction of lingerprints).
Despit': ~he ~ouo's ~urance in. Davis supra note 76, that fingerprints: cannot be destroyed, the Fagan case demonstrates that
remove their fingerprints and thus frustrate prompt identification.
77

.

sus~ts might attempt to

Dunaway v. New York: Is There a Military Application?
Captain Elizabeth W. Wallace•
Contract Appeals Division, USALSA
Introduction
In the late 1970's, the Supreme Court ruled in two cases
that the illegal seizure of an individual based on less than !
probable cause eould r~ult in suppression of evidence ob·
tained as a ·result of the ·seizure. The· nat~re of traditional
investigative techniques employed by military law enforcement !lgencies significantly elevates the importance of these

decisions. The purpose of this article is ~o analyze th~ Supreme Court and military cases that have addressed this
issue and to propose a rationale by which a military eourt
might fairly reconcile these caSes with accepted military' investigatory practices.
·. In the first case, Brown v. Illinois, '·police officers "arrest·
ed" the accused without a warrant. Following a lengthy

•This article was originally submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the 36th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course.
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